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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF U~fAH 
NEWELL J. OLSEN, operating under 
the name and style of NEWELL J. 
OLSEN & SONS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ROLAND A. REESE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
g I\ j . . S-'1' Q.L G. DAINES, 
.rr A 1~ _J ~~ · .f LMLos DAINES, 
JUL 31 \948Attorneys for Defendant 
and ~spondent. 
CLiiK:&uiR£t:\i-o-auiT.-utAH 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District 
of the State of Utah, in and for Cache County. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
:L\E\VELL J. OLSEN, operating under 
the name and style of NEWELL J. 
OLSEN & SONS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ROLAND A. REESE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant in his statement of facts and through-
out his brief, has, contrary to the pleadings, asserted that 
his action is one based on quantum merit instead of one 
based on a written contract, which is the case. He has 
also taken the position that the respondent herein claimed 
nothing for his demurrer filed in the City Court. This 
assertion is also unfounded. To the foregoing, the res-
pondent takes exception. (Tr. 5, 6 and 7.) 
For the purpose of clarity in setting forth respon-
dent's position, he is herein setting forth the pertinent 
parts of appellant's complaint. These are as follows: 
2. That on or about the 20th day of March, 1946, 
the plaintiff and defendant made and entered into 
an agreement by which plaintiff agreed to build a 
basement apartment for defendant in his home at 
3rd North and 4th East Street, Logan City, specifi-
cally agreeing to do and construct certain specific 
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2 
and stated items, and further agreeing that "any 
alterations shall be paid for as extra work." Said 
agreement is in words and figures as follows: 
-
BUILDING AGREEMENT 
This building agreement made and entered into this 
20th day of March A.D. 1946, by and between Mr. 
Roland Reese, as first party, and Newell J. Olsen, 
operating under the name of Newell J. Olsen & Sons, 
as second party, WITNESSETH: 
That for and in consideration of the sum of $1,150.00, 
to be paid in cash by first party at the rate of 65% 
as the work is done, balance when finished, second 
party hereby agrees to build .a basement apartment for 
first party, furnishing all necessary labor and ma-
terials, exclusive of all plumbing, and all wiring. 
Second party more particularly agrees to do the 
following: ~ ~ ~ 
Any additional work shall be paid for by first party 
as parties hereto shall later agree upon. Any alter-
ations shall be paid for by first party as extra work. 
Second party shall also furnish all hardware and 
shall do all work in a good and workmanlike manner. 
Is/ ROLAND A.-REESE, 
First Party 
Is/ NEWELL J. OLSEN, 
Second Party. 
3. That plaintiff has fully performed his said agree-
ment, has furnished all material and done all the work 
and labor, as called for in said agreement, except 
defendant furnished one door for which he is en-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
titled to a credit of $5.00, and except also, plaintiff 
did not put in wooden floor, for which defendant 
is entitled to an agreed credit of $150.00, which left 
a balance due and owing to the plaintiff on said 
specified items mentioned in the contract of $995.00 
4. That in addition to performing the specific items 
mentioned in the contract, the plaintiff also, at the 
special instance and request of defendant, or de-
fendant's wife, made and performed n1any alterations, 
for which plaintiff is entitled to pay as extra work, 
which are as follows: # # #"' 
(Tr. 5, 6 and 7.) 
To appellant's complaint, the respondent filed a 
general demurrer in the City Court of Logan City, which 
the City Court overuled. (Tr. 10 and 11.) 
On the 20th day of February, 1948, a jury was em-
panelled to try the above case, and the appellant was 
sworn and testified. Among other things he testified that 
he was a general contractor having engaged in such busi-
ness for about three years. ( Tr. 62, 85.) 
During cross examination of the appellant it was 
stipulated by his counsel that at the date of the execution 
of the contract set out in appellant's complaint, that he, 
the appellant, did not have a contractor's license as is 
required by 79-5a-1 of the Utah Code Annoted 1943. 
(Tr. 92 and 93.) 
Upon motion of counsel for the respondent, the Dis-
trict Court dismissed the applellant' s complaint on the 
grounds that the appellant failed to prove that at the 
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time of the execution of the contract sued upon, he was a 
licensed contractor in the State of Utah, and upon the 
further ground that the complaint did not state a cause 
of action. (Tr. 94.) 
The appellant did not request or ask leave of the 
Court to amend his complaint after the trial. 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
The District Court did· not err in dismissing the 
appellant's complaint and its judgment should be sus-
tained. From a reading of the appellant's complaint it 
is apparent on its face that he has declared upon a written 
agreement and not quantum meruit as appellant asserts 
throughout his brief. (Tr. 5, 6, 7.) 
The appellant in his complaint failed to state a cause 
of action and it is fatally defective for the following 
reasons: 
1. That inasmuch as appellant is a contractor within 
the provisions of chapter 5, title 79, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943, his failure to allege and plead in his complaint that 
he had fully complied with the requirements of the license 
law and that he was a duly licensed contractor as required 
by the laws of this State, or the reason, if any, why no 
license was required, rendered his complaint fatally de-
fective, and 
2. Appellant failed to allege and plead that he had 
performed all of the conditions precedent required in 
said contract by him to be performed or the excuse for 
non-performance. 
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NECESSITY OF LICENSE 
During the trial of appellant's case, his own evidence 
affirmativelY showed that at the time of the execution 
and entering into of the written agreement declared upon 
by the appellant that he did not have a contractors license 
as required by the laws of this State, the contract was thus 
null and void. 
As aforementioned, the appellant was a contractor 
within the provisions of the laws of this state and that 
his failure to have a license and to be so licensed and to 
allege in his complaint that he was so licensed, or the 
reason why no license was necessary rendered his com-
plaint fatally defective. 
The statutory provisions applicable and pertinent to 
this case are as follows: 
<C79-5a-l. License to do Business. 
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, copartner-
ship, corporation, association, or other organization, 
or any combination of any thereof, to engage in the 
business or act in the capacity of contractor within 
this state without having a license therefor, as herein 
provided 0 0 0 
79-5a-3. «Contractor'~' Defined. 
A contractor within the meaning of this act is a 
person ° 0 0 , who for a fixed sum, price, fee, per-
centage or other compensation other than wages, 
undertakes with another for the construction, altera-
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tion, repair, addition to or improvement of any build-
ing 79-5a-4. Licenses - Application for - Fee -
Qualifications - Rules and Regulations. 
Any person, ~ ~ 0 desiring to obtain a license under 
this act shall make application in writing, ~ ~ ~ No 
license shall be issued until the department of regis-
tration is satisfied upon evidence presented and re-
corded as to the integrity of the applicant and that 
said applicant is qualified in the following respects to 
hold a license:" 
( 1) That the applicant is of good reputation; 
( 2) That the applicant has never been refused 
a license or had a license revoked for reasons that 
should preclude the granting of the license applied 
for 0 ~ ~ 
79-5a-6. Unprofessional Conduct - Complaint -
Hearings - Appeal to District Court. 
Any person ~ ~ ~ may file a duly certified com-
plaint with the department of registration charging 
that a licensee is guilty of one or more of the follow-
ing acts or omissions: ~ ~ o 
0 0 ~ If the department of registration's decisior .. 
be that the license has been guilty of any such acts 
or omissions, it may suspend or cancel the contractors 
license ~ 0 ~ 
79-5a-10. Violation of Act - Penalty. 
Any person o o o acting in the capacity of a con-
tractor within the meaning of this act, without a 
license as herein provided, shall upon conviction 
thereof, if a person, be punished by a fine of not to 
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exceed five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in 
the county jail for a term not to exceed six months, 
or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the dis-
cretion of the court. i) i) 4 
In the ca:se of Dow et.al v. United States for the Use 
and benefit of Holley, 154 Fed. 2d. 707, the Court said: 
The Federal Court in construing the foregoing act 
held that it was passed by legislature under its police 
power for the protection of the publc, and that the con-
tractors of unlicensed contractors could not be enforced. 
Although Chapter 5a of Title 79 (Contractors) has 
not been interpreted by this Court, it has been by the 
Circuit Court of Appeals of the Tenth District. 
«The remaining question concerns itself with the 
right of Holley to maintain the action. At the time 
the subcontract was entered into and at the time 
the work was done under it, he did not have a license 
by the State of Utah authorizing him to engage in 
the trade or occupation of a contractor. Title 79, 
Utah Code 1943, has reference generally to licenses 
issued by the Department of Registration for engag-
ing in certain businesses or professions. Section 79-
1-38 provides that it shall be unlawful for any person 
to practice or engage in the practice of any profession, 
trade, or occupation subject to the department with-
out authority so to do as provided in the title. Sec-
tion 79-5a-l makes it unlawful for any person, firm, 
copartnership, corporation, association, or other or-
ganization to engage in the business or act in the 
capacity of contractor within the state without hav-
ing a license therefor as therein provided, unless 
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such persons, firm, corporation, association, or other 
organization is particularly exempted by the act. 
Section 79-5a-2 provides certain exemptions but they 
do not have bearing here. The presently material 
part of section 79-5a-3 provides that a contractor 
shall include any person who for a fixed sum or 
price, other than wages, undertakes for another any 
excavation, and that the term contractor, as used 
in the act, shall include subcontractor. Section 79-
5a-4 deals with the making of applications for licenses 
as a contractor and the issuance of such licenses. 
And section 79-5a-10 provides a penalty for acting 
in the capacity, of a contractor without having a 
license. Neither these statutory provisions nor any 
others called to our attention provide in express 
language that a contract employing an unlicensed 
contractor to perform services falling within the field 
of his trade shall be unenforceable. But the statutory 
requirements to obtain a license before engaging in 
the trade is a police regulation for the protection of 
the public, Smith, v. American Packing & Provision 
Co. 102 Utah 351, 130 P. 2d. 951; a penalty is pro-
vided for the violation of the statutory exaction; 
and it is the well settled general rule that in ordinary 
circumstances, a contract entered into by an un-
licensed person in contravention of the statutory 
provisions of this kind will not be enforced. Wedge 
wood v. Jorgens) 190 :Mich. 620, 157 N.W. 360; 
Hickey v. Sutton, 191 Wis. 313, 210 N.W. 704; Sher-
wood v. Wise, 132 Wash. 295, 232 P. 309, 42 A.L.R. 
1219; Lund v. Bruflat, 159 Wash. 89, 292 P. 112; 
American Store Equipment & Construction Corpora-
tion v. Jack Dempsey's Punch Bowl, Inc., 283 N.Y. 
601, 28 N.E. 2nd. 23; Massie v. Dudley, 173, Va. 42, 
3 S.E. 2d. 176; Board of Education v. Elliott, 276, 
Ky. 790, 125 S.W. 2nd 733." 
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The Supreme Court of this State in the case of Ander-
son Ys. Johnson, 108 Utah 417, 160 P. 2d. 275, construed 
chapter 2 of title 82, Utah Code Annotated 1943, our 
statutory provisions regulating real estate brokers and real 
estate salesmen. This act is similar to the statute in 
question. This court, in an opinion by Justice Turner held 
that such statutes were enacted under the police powers 
of the state and for the protection of the public. The 
Court said: 
"It is apparent that the statutes were enacted, not to 
provide revenue, but to provide for registration and 
regulation of those engaged in the real estate bus-
iness. The license fee is so nominal that no other 
conclusion is tenable. In Koeberle v. Hotchkiss, 8 
Cal. App. 2d. 634, 48 P. 2d. 104, 107, Justice Crail 
stated: "The primary purpose of the Real Estate 
Brokers' Act was to require real estate brokers and 
salesmen to be 'honest, truthful and of good repu-
tation:"' 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the case of Hickey 
et.al v. Sutton, 210 N.W. 704, held that a contract entered 
into by an unlicensed architect as required by the statutes 
of this state was void. The Court said: 
"The only conflicting authorities with reference to 
the rule that the failure to procure license bars 
recovery for services rendered is in those cases where 
the statute which requires a license as a revenue 
measure and not for the protection of the public. 
There is no conflict in the authorities upon the rules 
that the failure to procure a license bars recovery 
where the license is enacted as a police measure for 
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the protection of the public. The rule applies with 
equal force whether the requirement is sought upon 
a written contract or quantum meruit. If the neces-
sity of procuring a license could be avoided by neg-
lecting to make the contract and those recovering 
upon quantum meruit, an easy way out would be 
found to nullify the contract. 
It is not necessary that the pleadings should raise 
the question that the appellant has not procured the 
license required." 
In the construction of a staute similar to ours, the 
Supreme Court of Virginia in the case of Massie vs. Dud-
ley, 3 S.E. 2d. 176, said: 
"It is a well settled principle of law that the Courts 
will not be a part to enforce an agreement made 
in furtherance of objects forbidden by statutes or 
by common law, or general policy of law, or to re-
cover damages for its breach, or when the agreement 
has been executed in whole or in part by payment 
or money to recover it back # # # The law refuses 
to enforce illegal contracts, as a rule, not out of 
regard for the party objecting, nor for any wish to 
protect his interest, but from reasons of public policy. 
When even, therefore, the illegality of the contract 
appears whether alleged in the pleadings or made 
known for the first time in the evidence, it is fatal 
to the case # # # The law not enforce contracts 
founded in its violations." 
To the same effect are the following cases: Board 
of Education et. al v. Ellitt 125 S.W. 2d. 733. Wedge· 
wood v. Jorgens 137 N.W. 360. 
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The American Store Equipment & Construction Cor-
poration, Appellant v. Jack Dempsey's Punch Bowl, 
Inc. 28 N .E. 2d. 23. 
Boxer v. Schroeter et. al. 7 N. 2d. 262. Maddox v. 
Yocum 31 N. E. 2d. 652. 
Kirkman et. al. v. Borzag 150 P. 2d. 3. 
Phillips v. ~1cintosh et.al. 124 P. 2d. 835. 
As pointed out by the foregoing authorities, when a 
statute declares that it shall be unlawful to perform 
certain acts, without a license, and imposes a penalty 
for violation; contracts for such acts are necessarily 
void and incapable of enforcement. In this respect 
our statutes present a stronger case for these being 
within the State police. power and for the protection of 
the public in that they provide that such contracts 
are not only unlawful and provide a penalty for their 
violation but they also provide among other things 
that the department of registration, before issuing 
a license, must find the apllicant to be a person of good 
reputation and integrity, that he has never been refused 
a license or had a license revoked for good reason. ( 79-
Sa-4, Utah Code Annotated 1943.) Our act further pro-
vides that a license may be revoked for professional mis-
conduct. (79-5a-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1943.) In 
view of the foregoing can it be said that our act is not 
for the protection of the public, and passed as a police 
measure? 
That the appellant is a contractor within the pro-
vision of Title 79-5a-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, is 
apparent from the face of the complaint, for in the con-
tract set out therein it declares: 
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"This building agreement <t <t <t for and in consider-
ation of the sum of $1150.00 to be paid in cash by the 
first party at the rate of 65% as the work is done, 
balance when finished, the second party agrees to 
build a basement apartment for first party, furnishing 
all necessary labor and materials >0 >0 >0 Any addi-
tional work shall be paid for by first part as parties 
hereto shall later agree upon. Any alterations shall 
be paid for by first party as extra work." (Tr. 5 and 
6.) 
We call your attention to the pertinent part of 79-
5a-3, Utah Code Annotated 1943: 
"Contractor'~' Defined. 
A contractor within the meaning of this act is a 
person >0 >0 >0 who fo ra fixed sum, fee percentage 
or other compensation other than wages, undertakes 
with another for the construction, alteration, repair, 
addition to or improvement of any building >0 ° 0 
other than to personalty, or any part thereof 0 0 ~~<" 
That the appellant is a contractor within the mean-
ing of the act is plain as the consideration for the services 
to be rendered and the materials furnished was fixed, 
except as to extras and this was to be agreed upon by 
the parties. The only exception which takes a person 
out of the act as a cantractor is when the compensation 
received is in wages. The appellant in suing for the extras 
which the appellant alleged he furnished, did not sue for 
wages but for what he regarded as a proper cost for labor 
and materials. Wages are paid for at an hourly, weekly 
or monthly rate, and appellant's claim here is not based 
upon any such a basis. 
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PLEADINGS 
As the appellant herein is a contractor within the 
provisions of chapter 5a, title 79, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943, and he is seeking to recover for services rendered 
as such, he must allege facts which show that he was 
licensed at the time that the contract was entered into 
or that he was exempted therefrom, and in failing to do 
so, he did not state a cause of action. (Tr. 5 and 6.) 
The Supreme Court of this state in the case of Smith 
vs. American Packing Provision Company, 102 Utah 351, 
130 P. 2d, 951, has so ruled. This was the case in which 
an action was brought by an architect for services rend-
ered, the licensing of which is also controlled by title 79, 
Utah Code Annotated 1943. In an opinion written by 
Justice McDonough, the Court said: 
"'The appellant contends that all of the matters raised 
by the defendant constitute matters of defence which 
plaintiff does not have to negative. However, the 
general n1le is that where a person seeks recovery 
for professional services for which a license is re-
quired as a condition precedent to the r~ndition of 
such services for a fee, such person must allege and 
prove facts, which show he was licensed at the time 
such services were performed, so that he was ex-
empted from the class required to have such license." 
That the rule as announced by this Court is in ac-
cord with the weight of authority is apparent from the 
authorities. 
53 C.J.S. page 716, section 59a, says: 
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"It is incumbent on a person whose right to recover 
on a contract is dependent on his having been lie-· 
ensed to plead and prove, as a part of his cause of 
action, that he had fully complied with the require-
ments of the license law, or else to plead and prove 
that under the corcumstances, the requirement was 
not applicable and he was not required to take out 
a license or pay a license tax ~ ~ ~ ." 
To the same effect are the following cases: Kirkman 
vs. Borzage, 150 P. 2d. 3; Phillips v. Mcintosh, 124 
P. 2d. 835; Meinhard vs. Stillwell Realty Company, 
169 S.E. 732; Maddox v. Yocum, 31 N .E. 2d. 652; 
Rosenfield v. Jeffra, 1 N.Y.S. 2d. 388; Clark vs. Eads, 
165 S.W. 2d. 1019; Swift v. Kelly, 133 S.W. 901; 
Hoxsey vs. Baker, 246 N.W. 653. 
FAILURE TO ALLEGE PERFORMANCE 
Appellant further fails to state a cause of action as 
he did not allege in his complaint that he performed all 
of the conditions precedent in the contract required by 
him to be performed, or the excuse of non-performance, 
if any (Tr. 5, 6 and 7.) 
In paragraph 3 of his complaint, appellant alleged: 
"~ ~ ~ plaintiff has duly performed his said agree-
ment, has furnished all the material and done all 
the work and labor as required for said agreement, 
except defendant furnished one door, for which he 
is entitled to a credit of $5.00, and except also plain-
tiff did not put in a wooden floor, for whom the 
defendant is entitled to agreed credit of $150.00~ 4 4 .~' 
The appellant thus by his pleadings negatives his 
performance. He admitted none-performance and yet 
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he fails to allege the reason for such non-perfmmance. 
That is, whether tt was waived or consented to by the 
respondent. 
The contract further provides that as to additional 
work for which appellant is sueing that its "costs" were 
to be determined by the parties: 
"
0 0 0 Any additional work shall be paid for by 
first party as parties shall hereto later agree upon, 
and any alterations shall be paid for by first party 
as extra work." (Tr. 6.) 
The appellant nothwithstanding the provisions of 
the contract requiring the parties to the agreement to 
fix the cost of additional work or extras, failed to allege 
the reason, if any, ~hy they did not agree to the cost 
of such items. (Tr. 5 and 6.) 
The law is that it is necessary in a suit upon a con-
tract that the party declaring thereon must either allege 
performance or an excuse for non-performance. The 
Supreme Court of Oregon in the case of Ball vs. Daud, 
37 P. 70, in a similar factual situation, held that where 
a contract provided that in the event of alterations or 
additions, the value thereof should be appraised by an 
architect and that he should fix the amount that should 
be paid for such alterations and additions. The Court 
said: 
"In Meyers v. Construction Co., 20 Or. 603, 27 Pac. 
584, it was held that where a contract provided that 
disputes arising between parties should be submitted 
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to some certain person for settlement, whose decision 
should be final, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff, 
in an action upon the contract, to allege and prove 
a compliance with that condition, or at least that 
a reasonable effort had been made to comply with 
the stipulation; and thus the distinction in Scott v. 
Avery, supra, was established as the rule of inter-
pretation in this state." 
An then again the Court said: 
"
0 0 0 The plaintiff having set out a copy of the 
contract, and not having alleged a compliance with 
its conditions, his complaint was ~emurrable. Myers 
v. Construction Co., supra; 2 Estee, Pl. & Pr. (3d Ed.) 
Section 3183. By answering to its merits, and not 
pleading in abatement, it is contended that the de-
fendant has waived her right to insist upon the pro-
visions of the contract. The object of a plea in abate-
ment is to show to the court some allegation of fact 
that does not appear from the pleadings. Koenig 
v. Nott, 2 Hilt. 328. The complaint having set out 
the contract containing the provision to refer, the 
Court was in possession of the fact, and there was no 
need fo a plea in abatement. Failing to allege, after 
setting out the contract, that the amount due had 
been ascertained in the manner therein required, 
the complaint did not state facts sufficient to consti-
tute a cause of suit (Myers v. Construction Co. 
supra,) and this objection is not waived by failure 
to demur or answer (Hill's Code, Section 71 ) , and 
may be urged on appeal (Evarts v. Steger, 5 Or. 
147). The complaint not having stated a cause of 
suit, the decree will therefore be reversed, and the 
complaint dismissed."' 
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It would thus seem that in this pa~ticular case, the 
appellant for the reasons above stated has failed to state 
a cause of action. Although he alleged performance he 
qualified it without stating the reason for such no-per-
formance, and particularly failed to state why the parties 
to the agreement did not fix the cost for the extra work, 
for which he seeks to recover. 
FURTHER ANSWERING APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
The appellant herein complained that although he 
did not assign it an arror, the Court erred in refusing to 
permit him to amend his complaint. 
In this respect the record discloses that at the begin-
ning of the trial the appellant requested the Court for 
leave to amend his complaint, and that leave to amend 
was granted. ( Tr. 43 and 44.) That thereafter the 
appellant never requested or asked leave of the Court to 
amend his pleadings, (Tr. 43 and 9.) from the instant 
of the Court calling the case to trial until the dismissal 
of the action. The record further discloses that the action 
was dismissed on the 20th day of February, 1948 (Tr. 
43 and 97) and that between this date and the signing 
of the judgment and Dismissal by the Court on the 30th 
day of March, 1948, the appellant did not ask leave of 
the Court to amend his complaint. 
Even assuming that appellant was in a position to 
assign such as error it would appear from the amended 
rules of Practice Rule 8 and from the decision of this 
state, that the matter will not be considered by the Court 
for the reason that it was not assigned as error. 
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However, we would like to call the attention of the 
Court to what we regard as a misapplication by the ap-
pellant of the Utah case of Smith vs. American Packing 
Company, supra. The applellant cited this case as au-
thority for the statement that the Court erred in failing 
to permit him to amend. In the Smith vs. American 
Packing Company, supra, the appellant requested leave 
to amend and hte right was denied by the trial Court. 
The court said at pages 959 and 960: 
"The defects which we have mentioned are ~ot dis-
cussed by either the lower court in the memorandum 
ruling or demurrer or in the brief of the respondent. 
They are matters which ordinarily can be corrected 
by amendment at any time prior to judgment with-
out prejudice to the opposing party. In view of the 
fact the amended complaint is deficient in essential 
allegations, we would be compelled to uphold the 
judgment of the district court if the court had merely 
sustained the demurrer and had not denied the plain-
tiff leave to amend ~ ~ ~, 
That the appellant is in no position to complain for 
his failure to amend inasmuch as he himself elected to 
stand on his pleadings. He at no time made any request 
or asked leave of the Court to amend as aforementioned. 
The appellant a] so assigns as error the Court's state-
ment to counsel for the respondent «If you make a motion 
to dismiss, I will grant it." That the Court was not only 
within its province in making such a statement, but that 
it was its duty to do so, is the holding of the case in 
Hickey et. al v. Sutton, 210 N.W. 704, supra. This was 
a case involving an illegal contract. The Court said: 
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"If the objection be not made by the party charged 
.it is the duty of the Court to make it on its own be-
half. The Courts owe it to the public, justice and 
to their own integrity to refuse to become parties to 
contracts essentially violating morality of public pol-
icy, by entertaining actions upon them. It is the 
judicial duty always to turn a suitor upon such a 
contract out of Court whenever and however the 
character of the contract is made to appear."' 
Although the appellant did not assign as error, he 
alleges in his brief that the Court erred in holding that 
the appelleant was a contractor and was unlicensed. That 
these were questions for the jury to decide. He claimed 
that there was a dispute in the evidence. We again call 
the Court's attention to the fact that this was not assigned 
as error and that such cannot be taken advantage of 
under the rules of this Court, even assuming that such 
was error. However, we would like to call the Court's 
attention to the fact that the evidence in this respect is 
not in conflict. The contract was entered into on the 
20th day of March, 1948 ( Tr. 5, 62 and 85), and counsel 
stipulated that on this date the appellant did not have 
a contractor's license. (Tr. 92 and 93). This is the only 
evidence in the record as to the question of whether or 
not the appellant did not have a contractor's license at 
the date of the execution of the agreement, and that evi-
dence is thus not in dispute. American jurisprudence in 
this respect sets out the law to be as follows: 
"12 Am. Jur. page 744, section 225: 
Determination by Court or Jury.- Inveiw of the fact 
that the sources of public policy are usually legisla-
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tion and judicial decisions, the question whether a 
particular agreement is contrary to public policy is 
ordinarily to be determined by the Court, and not 
by the jury. This is so at least where the facts are 
conceded or not disputed. 
We thus respectfully submit that in view of the 
reasons heretofore set forth that the judgment of the trial 
Court should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEWEL G. DAINES, 
L. DeLOS DAINES, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
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